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NOTES
COURTS AND GOVERNMENT COMPELLED
URINALYSIS: JUMPING TO FOURTH
AMENDMENT CONCLUSIONS
Whether the government1 should or can subject its employees to
urinalysis to detect illegal drug use ("compelled urinalysis") has been an
issue of great public controversy in recent years.2 In general, the courts
have held that the fourth amendment protects government employees
1. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only government procedures that constitute unreasona-
ble "searches" or "seizures." See infra note 3 for the text of the fourth amendment. Private employ-
ers can implement arbitrary drug testing procedures both as a pre-employment screening device and
as a condition of continuing employment. Private employers, however, must ensure that any drug
testing procedures they implement are consistent with their collective bargaining agreement(s) with
employee unions, anti-discrimination laws and certain common law rights employees may have.
Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
422, 427-33 (1985). See the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a), (b)(3), (d)(1984)
(under this act an employer's drug testing program constitutes a "working condition" and is subject
to the act's good faith collective bargaining requirements); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-96 (1984) and Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (while the act does not
protect the employment interests of current alcoholics or illegal drug users, it does protect controlled
alcoholics and former illegal drug users); See Rothstein, supra, at 433 for a discussion of common
law rights that may be violated by an employer's drug testing program.
Although states may contract away the power to tax or to make contracts regarding financial
matters, they cannot contract away their police power or their power of eminent domain. McGarry,
Public Sector Collective Bargaining and the Contract Clause, 31 LAB. L.J. 67, 68 (1980). Therefore,
the government probably cannot through collective bargaining (with unionized public employees)
contract away whatever power it has to compel employees to submit to urinalysis drug testing.
2. The emphasis of this Note is on government urinalysis drug testing of its employees ("com-
pelled urinalysis"). Urinalysis is the most widely used method of testing persons to detect illegal
drug use. T. Scrivner, LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING DRUG TESTING IN EMPLOYMENT 4 (Jan. 30,
1987) (available in St. Louis University Law Library). Other available tests analyze blood, saliva,
breath and hair. A test for measuring drug impairment through analysis of brain waves is currently
being studied. For a brief assessment of the limits of these latter types of tests, see id. at 4.
Urinalysis for detection of illegal drug use also has its limits. The method is sometimes inaccurate,
with false positive results occurring in up to 25% of tests given. Also, urinalysis for detection of
illegal drug use cannot measure the subject's level of impairment by any illegal drug; it indicates only
the presence of such substances. Further, urinalysis can detect marijuana and PCP use only after
their effect on the subject has worn off. It is also possible that urinalysis for detection of marijuana
generates positive results on tests of subjects who have inhaled only "sidestream" smoke. Id. at 4-6.
The urinalysis method can detect a subject's consumption of marijuana up to two months after
use, and cocaine consumption for two or three days after use. Id. at 5. See supra note 1 for a brief
discussion of drug testing by private employers and infra note 6 for a discussion of government drug
testing of prisoners and of private employees in "heavily regulated industries."
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against unreasonable administration of compelled urinalysis.3 Using the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment analysis, these courts have weighed
the government employers' interests against the employees' interests to
determine whether such testing was reasonable under the circumstances.4
Most courts have required that permissible compelled urinalysis must be
based, at a minimum, on government officials' "reasonable suspicion"
that the specific employees they seek to test are using illegal drugs.'
These courts have required reasonable suspicion without explaining why
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures, and therefore the test in
a fourth amendment case is whether the search or seizure involved was reasonable. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d
187, 201 (2d Cir. 1984). The fourth amendment applies to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963).
4. See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text (discussing the fourth amendment balancing
test for reasonableness).
5. See, eg., Labor R.R. Exec. Assoc. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988); Division 241
Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976) (court required finding of probable cause); American Federation of Gov't. Employ-
ees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp.
875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see also McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa),
modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (modification changed requirement of reasonable suspicion
that employee was then under the influence to a reasonable suspicion controlled substances had been
used within twenty-four hours prior to the test); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005
(D.C. 1985); Davis v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1968); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App.
138, 149, 310 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1974); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ.,
119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986); State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 847 (R.I. 1980). Contra
Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474-77 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (drug testing of all
armed services personnel permitted due to members' reduced expectancy of privacy arising from the
fundamental necessity of obedience and discipline in the military); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no fourth amendment bar to random drug testing of prisoners due to
prisoners' reduced expectancy of privacy relative to unincarcerated citizens). But see Jones v. Mc-
Kenzie 833 F.2d 335, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (no requirement of probable cause).
The court in Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), cited Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985), as an
authority that did not require reasonable suspicion for constitutionally compelling urinalysis of pub-
lic employees engaged in extremely hazardous work. However, although the Allen court held that
the city had a right to make warrantless searches of its employees for the purpose of determining
whether those employees were using illegal drugs, the tests were administered to employees who had
actually been seen smoking marijuana by an undercover detective hired by the city. The city hired
the detective in response to an unusually high number of accidents experienced by the work crew
and to a number of reports that the employees involved were using illegal drugs. Id. at 484. There-
fore, the city probably administered the tests based on "reasonable suspicion" of the specific workers,
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the relative importance or dangerousness of the particular public job in-
volved would not justify the use of a higher or lower standard of
suspicion.6
This Note, by contrast argues that the courts should develop a "sliding
scale" based on the nature of a public employee's position to determine
the level of suspicion the government employer must possess before it can
permissibly require the employee to submit to urinalysis.
Specifically, Part I of this Note outlines the courts' analyses in holding
that compelled urinalysis implicates fourth amendment protections,
while also presenting alternative arguments that such tests constitute
either fourth amendment searches or seizures. Part II discusses the
fourth amendment balancing test for reasonableness and outlines how
and it is not clear how the court might have reacted if the city had truly administered the tests on a
random basis.
The Supreme Court has held that other kinds of searches based on a standard less stringent than
probable cause are constitutionally permissible. See, eg., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979)
(visual body cavity searches of federal prisoners based on less than probable cause are not unreasona-
ble); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stopping a driver to check his license and regis-
tration based on reasonable suspicions is reasonable); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (search of
a person for weapons based on reasonable suspicion is permissible).
The reasonable suspicion standard requires individualized suspicion, directed specifically at the
person who is subject to the search. See Hunter v Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1982). "Incho-
ate, unspecified suspicions" do not meet the requirement that officials rely on "specific objective facts
and rational inferences they are entitled to draw from those facts in light of their experience." Id. at
674. "Factors that may be taken into account in determining reasonable suspicion are (1) the nature
of the tip or information; (2) the reliability of the informant; (3) the degree of the corroboration; and
(4) other facts contributing to the suspicion or lack thereof." Security & Law Enforcement Employ-
ees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 1984).
One commentator has suggested that the most logical and productive standard for employee drug
testing, whether the employer is private or public, is whether the employee, if intoxicated on the job,
would present a "substantial danger" to himself, other persons, or property. Rothstein, supra note 1,
at 424-26. The author also argues that "without a showing of substantial danger" in the employees'
work, the need for drug testing would not outweigh employees' privacy interests." Id. at 425.
6. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (listing the four levels of judicially recognized
suspicion). The court in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474-77 (D.C. Cir.
1975), held that drug testing of all armed services personnel was permissible due to members' re-
duced expectancy of privacy arising from the fundamental necessity of obedience and discipline in
the military. Tests are also justified on grounds that high drug use in the military reduces efficiency
and performance.
Courts have also allowed random drug testing of prison inmates and government compelled
urinalysis of private employees in "heavily regulated industries." See Storms v Coughlin, 600 F.
Supp. 1214, 1216-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (arbitrary drug testing of prisoners). For cases involving heav-
ily regulated industries, see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (heavy regulation of
firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor); Shoemaker v.
Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1155-56 (D.N.J. 1985) (horse racing); and Matter of Martin, 90 N.J.
295, 319-21, 447 A.2d 1290, 1302-03 (N.J. 1982) (casino gambling).
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courts have applied the test to specific compelled urinalysis schemes.
Part III argues for fourth amendment balancing which responds at least
to significant differences in the nature of public jobs, so that courts would
require a lower standard of suspicion for permissible testing of public
employees holding relatively important or dangerous jobs. Finally, Part
IV argues that "reasonable suspicion" is not necessarily the highest stan-
dard of suspicion appropriate for constitutionally permissible compelled
urinalysis of public employees.
I. DOES COMPELLED URINALYSIS REALLY IMPLICATE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS?
A. Lower Courts Say Yes
The fourth amendment establishes an individual's right against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by government officials. 7 Therefore, unless
compelled urinalysis constitutes either a search or seizure, the fourth
amendment will not protect public employees from unreasonable admin-
istration of these tests. Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether compelled urinalysis implicates the fourth amendment, 8 most
lower courts confronted with the question have held that these tests con-
stitute fourth amendment searches.9 At least one court held that com-
pelled urinalysis was a fourth amendment seizure.10
7. The fourth amendment does not apply to government procedures not having search or
seizure status. Such procedures need not be "reasonable." See Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985, 74 GEo. L.J. 499 (1986)
[hereinafter Project]. See supra note 3 (text of fourth amendment and brief discussion).
8. The most analogous Supreme Court decision is Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966), in which the Supreme Court held that a state compelled blood alcohol test constitutes a
fourth amendment search. Unlike urinalysis, however, the blood test involves an intrusion beyond
the skin's surface. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Schmerber Court's
opinion).
9. See, eg., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); American Federation of Gov't. Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Lavvorn v. Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 800 (D.
Tenn. 1986); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D. N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.
Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga.
1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Turner v. Fraternal Order
of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985); Davis v District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417, 419 (D.C.
1968) (the court also held that compelled breathalyzer tests are fourth amendment searches); Ewing
v. State, 160 Ind. Ct. App. 138, 149, 310 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1974); State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 846-
47 (R.I. 1980) (the court also held that compelled breathalyzer tests are fourth amendment
searches).
10. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (the McDonell court
distinguished the production of a body waste specimen from the blood test in Schmerber, observing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/5
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Courts using the "search" approach have relied heavily on Schmerber
v. California.11 In Schmerber, the Supreme Court held that a state com-
pelled blood test constituted a fourth amendment search.12  The Court
noted that the fourth amendment expressly provides U.S. citizens with
the right to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures.13 The Court concluded that a compelled blood test, which in-
volved a needle's intrusion beyond the body's surface, "plainly" consti-
tuted a fourth amendment search.14 The Court also stated that a
person's interest in personal dignity and privacy, protected by the fourth
amendment, forbade these intrusions where the police had only a mere
chance of obtaining the desired evidence. 5
Many courts applying Schmerber to compelled urinalysis do not pro-
vide any rationale for that extension of the Supreme Court's holding. 6
that because urine is routinely discharged from the body, no physical intrusion is necessary to obtain
a specimen); cf. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(court deemed compelled urinalysis a fourth amendment "search and seizure" but relied exclusively
on McDonell which held that the procedure was a fourth amendment seizure) (emphasis added).
11. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber was taken to a hospital for injuries he sustained when he
crashed his car into a tree. He was arrested after a policeman noticed the smell of alcohol on his
breath. While at the hospital the policeman told the attending doctor to take a blood sample from
Schmerber for blood/alcohol analysis. The blood sample was drawn despite Schmerber's refusal to
consent to the test. Id. at 758-59.
12. Id. at 767. In addition to Schmerber's fourth amendment claim, the Court also considered
whether the compelled blood test violated Schmerber's fourteenth amendment right to due process
of law, his sixth amendment right to counsel, or his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 759. As to the fifth amendment claim, the Court held that the fifth amendment only
protects one from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. The Court held that the withdrawal of blood
and use of its composition as evidence was not included in that category of "communicative" evi-
dence. Id. at 761. Thus, the Court held that the fifth amendment does not bar the use of the
defendant's body or its components as physical or real evidence. See also United States v. Nesmith,
121 F. Supp. 758, 762 (D.D.C. 1954); Davis v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417, 418-19 (D.C.
1968).
13. 384 U.S. at 767.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 769-70. While the Schmerber Court did not find that compelled blood tests were
forbidden by the fourth amendment, it held that the constitutionality of such a procedure depended
on whether fourth amendment reasonableness standards were met. Id. at 770. For later cases in-
volving physically intrusive searches, see, eg., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)(extensive surgery
to remove bullet held unreasonable); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977) (surgical removal of bullet held reasonable); United States v. Shields, 453
F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1972) (body cavity search held reasonable); Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d
1339 (D.C. 1981) (surgical removal of bullets held reasonable). See generally Note, Analyzing the
Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 130 (1984).
16. See, eg., Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Susey, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Davis v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d, 417, 418 (D.C.
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Some courts have drawn an analogy between the compelled blood test in
Schmerber and compelled urinalysis. Those courts relying on this anal-
ogy have focused on the compelled production of body fluid rather than
on the procedure17 used to obtain the sample. For example, after distin-
guishing compelled urinalysis from the taking of fingerprints, fingernail
and hair samples, a district court in American Federation of Gov't. Em-
ployees v. Weinbergert8 asserted that compelled urinalysis "most closely
resembles the taking of a blood sample."' 9 The court in Lovvorn v. Chat-
tanooga2° concluded that because blood tests were subject to fourth
amendment constraints, it was clear that compelled urinalysis likewise
involved a fourth amendment search.2' In Storms v. Coughlin,22 the court
noted that both compelled blood tests and compelled urinalysis would
require forced extraction of body fluids, and reasoned that compelled
urinalysis thus involved an "intrusion beyond the body surface."23
In Allen v. City of Marietta,24 the court stated that a blood test qualita-
tively differed from compelled urinalysis, but still held that compelled
urinalysis was a fourth amendment search.25 The court relied on deci-
sions which had extended Schmerber to hold that compelled breathalyzer
and urine sample tests were fourth amendment searches.26
At least one court has held that compelled urinalysis was a fourth
amendment seizure.2 7 In McDonell v. Hunter,28 the court reasoned that
because a person possessed a reasonable and legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information contained in his body fluids, compelled urinal-
1968); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 149, 310 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1974); and State v. Locke, 418
A.2d 843, 847 (R.I. 1980).
17. Schmerber, however, focused on the actual physical intrusion into the body (via hypoder-
mic needle) that occurs when a blood sample is withdrawn from a person. 384 U.S. at 768, 770.
18. 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
19. Id. at 733.
20. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
21. Id. at 879.
22. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23. Id. at 1218.
24. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
25. Id. at 488-89. See also Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1512-13 (D.N.J.
1986).
26. 601 F. Supp. at 488-89. In addition to citing Division 241 and Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App.
138, 310 N.E.2d 571 (1974) for authority holding that compelled urinalysis is a fourth amendment
search, the Allen court also cited courts which extended Schmerber to hold that breathalyzer test are
fourth amendment searches, e.g., State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980); State v. Berker, 120 R.I.
849, 391 A.2d 107 (1978); and Davis v. District of Columbia, 247 A.2d 417 (D.C. 1968).
27. See supra note 10.
28. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 66:325
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ysis was a fourth amendment seizure.29
B. Compelled Urinalysis is Not a Search Under
Schmerber v. California
The Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California does not sup-
port the conclusion that compelled urinalysis is a fourth amendment
search.3" Courts which have relied on Schmerber to hold that compelled
urinalysis is a fourth amendment search have over-extended the Supreme
Court's rule.3 In Schmerber, the Court emphasized that its holding was
narrowly confined to procedures involving actual physical intrusions into
the human body.32 Compelled urinalysis does not involve such an intru-
sion into the body, and therefore is not analogous to Schmerber's com-
pelled blood test. This point is best demonstrated by courts' inability to
articulate a convincing rationale for extending Schmerber to compelled
urinalysis.33
C. Alternative Search and Seizure Arguments
L Search Approach
Despite Schmerber's failure to answer the question, one can still argue
that compelled urinalysis is a search.34 In Boyd v. United States,3" the
Supreme Court held that a procedure whereby government officials com-
pelled a person to surrender documents to be used against him in a prop-
erty forfeiture hearing was a fourth amendment search.36 The Court
reasoned that the compelled production of documents effected "the sole
objective and purpose of search and seizure," and was therefore
equivalent to an actual physical search of that person's home or busi-
ness.37 According to the Boyd Court, a procedure which amounts to a
search or seizure when performed directly by government officials does
29. Id. at 1127.
30. See supra note 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing Schmerber).
31. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text (discussing cases that rely on Schmerber to
hold that compelled urinalysis was a fourth amendment search).
32. Schrnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, at 767, 769-70 (1966).
33. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (discussing cases which analogized compelled
urinalysis to blood tests).
34. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing why compelled urinalysis is not a
search under Schmerber).
35. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36. Id. at 621-22.
37. Id.
19881
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not lose fourth amendment search status merely because the government
finds that it could use coercion to achieve the same objective indirectly.
Suppose that a more "direct" or forceful alternative method of acquir-
ing a urine sample from an employee would constitute a search. Under
Boyd, compelling a public employee to submit to urinalysis by threaten-
ing to fire him if he refuses should also be a search. For example, if
public officials chose to obtain a urine sample from a reluctant employee
by a forceful catheretization, it is clear under Schmerber that such a pro-
cedure would amount to a search because it involves an actual physical
intrusion into the person's body.3" Applying Boyd, the process of acquir-
ing a urine sample from this reluctant employee should not lose "search
status" simply because the government can, as an indirect alternative,
compel production of the sample by threatening to fire the employee if he
refuses to cooperate.
One might argue that Boyd is simply not applicable to the compelled
urinalysis situation. While Boyd involved compelled production of some
documents, compelled urinalysis merely involves the production of a
sample of body waste, a substance in which a person has little or no
property interest. However, while this reasoning might carry some
weight were it asserted that compelled urinalysis involves a "seizure" of a
urine sample, it has nothing to do with whether a person subjected to
compelled urinalysis has been searched.
Finally, had the Boyd ruling been limited to criminal cases, the histori-
cal relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments would substan-
tially weaken the suggested analogy between the Boyd situation and
compelled urinalysis. The Boyd Court "relied heavily" on that relation-
ship.39 The Court believed that a government procedure that forced
someone to produce incriminating documents implicated that person's
fifth amendment rights. 4 One could therefore argue that Boyd is not
applicable to compelled urinalysis because the Supreme Court has since
held that the human body, body characteristics and body fluids are ex-
cluded from the kinds of "communicative materials," which, if produced
by state compulsion, would implicate a person's fifth amendment
38. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing the physical bodily intrusion in
Schmerber).
39. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364-66 (1959) (discussing Boyd).
40. Id.
[Vol. 66:325
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rights.4" However, the Boyd Court did not limit its holding to criminal
cases; Boyd itself was a noncriminal suit for property forfeiture pursuant
to U.S. customs revenue laws.42
2. Seizure Approach
Alternatively, courts could rely on a seizure analysis to hold that com-
pelled urinalysis for detection of illegal drug use implicates fourth
amendment protections. At least one court held that the procedure con-
stituted a fourth amendment seizure of a person's body fluids.43 How-
ever, courts have ignored the basis of the Schmerber Court's holding: the
government compelled blood test in that case involved a seizure of the
person, followed by the actual medical procedure which constituted the
search.44
A fourth amendment seizure results from a significant interference
with a person's liberty or property interests.45 Although the Supreme
Court in Schmerber did not elaborate a test for finding a seizure of the
person, the Court's test for seizure of the person in recent criminal cases
is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would believe he is
not free to leave the scene of "official contact."46 "Official contact" in
criminal cases involves police contact. Whether the test applies in the
compelled urinalysis situation depends on the meaning of the phrase
"free to leave."
Obviously, a public employee faced with a government directive to
submit to urinalysis drug testing is "free" to refuse the test, but that re-
fusal may cost him his job.47 Effectively, a public employee who has the
41. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966). See supra note 12 (discussing
Schmerber's fifth amendment claim and the Court's response).
42. 116 U.S. at 619.
43. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985). See supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (discussing the "seizure" portion of the McDonell opinion).
44. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. ("Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
'persons' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning of" the fourth
amendment.) (emphasis added).
45. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968) (interference with individual's liberty).
46. See supra note 44 for text of the Schmerber opinion concerning seizure of the person. For
Supreme Court discussion of the test it employs in determining "seizure of a person," see Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, reh'g de-
nied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980).
47. See, eg., Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir.
1976) (court upheld Chicago Transit Authority employee rule providing for disciplinary action
against employees refusing to submit to compelled urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion) and
Washington University Open Scholarship
334 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
reasonable desire to keep his job has no choice in the matter. Arguably a
public employee compelled to submit to urinalysis drug testing by the
threat of job loss has been "seized" and is entitled to fourth amendment
protections.48
One argument against this suggested seizure approach is that the anal-
ysis could not differentiate between the situation when a public employer
directs that employees submit to urinalysis and any other order to em-
ployees concerning their job functions. Consequently, a supervisor in a
public office would run the risk of "seizing" an employee any time he
required a subordinate to perform some job-related task. An answer to
this argument is that compelled urinalysis simply is not a usual job func-
tion. A public employer's requirement that an employee perform a task
is clearly distinguishable from a requirement that the employee submit to
urinalysis for detection of illegal drug use.
D. The Non-Criminal Approach of a Typical Compelled Urinalysis
Scheme Should Not Foreclose Fourth Amendment Analysis
To the extent a public employer's drug testing scheme primarily con-
cerns itself with maintaining a work force unimpaired by illegal drugs,
rather than with criminal prosecution of drug using employees, it may be
tempting to assert that the employees do not need the fourth amend-
ment's protections. However, fourth amendment protections apply to all
government searches and seizures, not just to those conducted in law
enforcement activity. In Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,49
the Supreme Court overruled Frank v. Maryland to the extent Frank
allowed warrantless investigatory searches. 5° In explaining its holding,
the Camara Court stated that "it is surely anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior."51
Therefore, if compelled urinalysis constitutes either a search or
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1006, (D.C. 1985) (court upheld police depart-
ment drug testing program which provided that a refusal by an employee to submit to compelled
urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion results in a proposal for termination).
48. Once it is shown that a government procedure implicates fourth amendment protections, a
court must then consider whether the procedure is reasonable in the circumstances. See infra notes
56-75 and accompanying text (discussing the fourth amendment balancing text for reasonableness).
49. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
50. Id. at 527-28.
51. Id. at 530.
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seizure, the fact that a particular public employer's drug testing scheme
involves only civil sanctions, such as mandatory medical treatment or
loss of job, does not allow that employer to avoid the fourth amend-
ment's requirement of reasonableness. It should be noted, on the other
hand, that it may be perfectly appropriate for a court to consider the type
and extent of sanction imposed when determining the reasonableness of a
drug testing scheme under the fourth amendment.
II. COMPELLED URINALYSIS SCHEMES AND COURTS' APPLICATION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST FOR
REASONABLENESS
A. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
Once a court determines that a government procedure implicates the
fourth amendment, it must then decide whether the procedure was rea-
sonable in the circumstances.52 Aside from several specifically estab-
lished exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable.53 Absent some emergency or special law enforcement
problem, the fourth amendment requires that a search be conducted
under a warrant based on probable cause and issued by an impartial judi-
cial officer.5" The warrant requirement has two exceptions relevant to
compelled urinalysis: 1) searches and seizures conducted upon the rea-
sonable need to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, 5 and 2)
searches and seizures conducted upon the reasonable need to protect the
official performing the search or seizure, the person subjected to the pro-
52. See supra notes 3 and 6 (text of fourth amendment and brief discussion).
53. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984), reh 'g denied, 469 U.S. 1197 (1985).
54, See Project, supra note 7 at 511-12. The Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
742 (1983), recites the following definition of "probable cause" for search: "[p]robable cause is a
flexible common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief .... " A "practical, nontechnical" probability that
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949).
55. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) involved such an exception. See infra notes
57-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reliance on the "destruction of evidence" ex-
ception to the warrant requirement).
Whether this exception is technically applicable to urinalysis for detection of illegal drug use is
questionable due to the substantial length of time such substances remain detectable in a person's
urine. This point is strengthened by the fact that urinalysis drug testing cannot measure the level of
impairment, unlike a blood test for alcohol content. However, the court in Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985) suggested the possibility that the "destruction of evi-
dence" exception might be applicable in drug urinalysis cases. Id. at 1009 n.8.
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cedure, or the public.56
A court considering the reasonableness of a search or seizure con-
ducted under an exception to the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment may still require the procedure to be based on probable cause. For
example, in Schmerber v. California 57 a police officer arrested a victim of
a car crash on suspicion of drunk driving, and forced him to submit to a
blood test for alcohol content.5" The Court found that the officer had
probable cause in the circumstances to arrest Schmerber, and that those
facts surrounding the arrest also constituted probable cause that Schmer-
ber was illegally intoxicated. The Court noted that search warrants are
ordinarily required for searches of homes, and that no less could be re-
quired for searches of the human body absent some emergency. How-
ever, the Court held that it was reasonable for the officer to believe an
emergency existed sufficient for him to proceed without a warrant. The
delay necessary to obtain a search warrant "threatened the destruction of
evidence" because the human body rapidly eliminates alcohol after con-
sumption has ceased.5 9
The Supreme Court has developed a balancing test to determine rea-
sonableness under the fourth amendment. The test involves balancing
the need to search ("public interest") against the invasion the search en-
tails ("private interest").' The Supreme Court has noted that the bal-
ancing test for reasonableness is susceptible to neither precise definition
nor mechanical application. 61 However, the Court has developed some
guidelines for applying the test.
First, the public interest in allowing a particular search should be con-
sidered in light of the purpose or objective of the search. For example, in
56. Other warrant requirement exceptions include: investigative detentions; public arrests;
seizures made after hot pursuit; searches incident to arrest; plain view seizures; searches of vehicles;
inventory searches; border searches; inspections at sea; and administrative inspections of certain
closely regulated industries. Project, supra note 7 at 510 n.58.
57. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
58. Id. at 758.
59. Id. at 770-7 1.
60. The Court apparently first adopted the test in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,
387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 539 (1967), for purposes of determining the reasonableness of warrantless
searches and seizures. The Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) adopted the
Camara test to determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness for all cases. Project, supra
note 7 at 514.
61. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
616-19 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-
21 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 768-72 (1966).
[Vol. 66:325
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/5
1988] COURTS AND GOVERNMENT COMPELLED URINALYSIS
Camara v. Municipal Court,62 the Supreme Court considered whether
searches of private homes for health code violations were reasonable
when the search warrants were based on less than probable cause. The
Court stated that the public need for such inspections must be weighed in
terms of the reasonable goals of health code enforcement. The primary
goal of urban health codes is to prevent conditions which foster
epidemics or fires. But because significant health code violations are
often hidden within buildings, effective health code compliance cannot be
achieved without periodic inspections based on a standard of suspicion
less than probable cause. Therefore, although the Court required such
searches to be conducted upon search warrants, it required a lower stan-
dard of suspicion than that usually required in criminal cases.63
Second, when determining relevant private interests, courts assess the
degree of invasion the search entails by considering the scope of the
search, the manner in which the search is conducted, and whether the
individual's interest is supported by a legitimate expectancy of privacy in
the circumstances. 64
When considering the "manner in which a search is conducted,"
courts note the degree of suspicion that triggered the government deci-
sion to perform a search.6" Courts recognize four suspicion levels: prob-
able cause,66 reasonable suspicion or belief,67 a use "of standardized
procedures involving neutral criteria"68 and per se reasonableness.6 9
Courts use the balancing test to determine whether a search, based on
the specific level of suspicion by government officials, was reasonable.70
If a court finds that a search was unreasonable in the circumstances, it
can also use the balancing test to determine whether that same search, if
based on a higher level of suspicion, would have been reasonable. 71 Simi-
larly, a more intrusive search requires a higher level of suspicion before
officials can constitutionally perform the search. For example, if a strip
62. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
63. Id. at 535-40.
64. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
65. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between the reasona-
bleness of a search and government official's degree of suspicion).
66. See supra note 54 for a definition of "probable cause."
67. See supra note 5 for a definition of "reasonable suspicion."
68. Project, supra note 7 at 512-13.
69. Id.
70. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
71. See court's discussion in Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 119
A.D.2d 35, 38-40, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (1986).
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search requires only reasonable suspicion by officials, a highly intrusive
body cavity search in the same circumstances might require probable
cause.72 Thus, as the public interest in or need for the search increases,
the amount of official suspicion necessary for a constitutional search
decreases.
B. How Courts Have Applied the Test to Compelled
Urinalysis Schemes
The court in Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway73 considered
whether compelled urinalysis of all military personnel without any par-
ticularized suspicion was reasonable. Although the court recognized that
members of the military were entitled to some level of constitutional pro-
tection, it held that such random testing of military personnel was rea-
sonable.74 The court based its decision on the conclusion that the
fundamental necessity of obedience and discipline in the military ren-
dered such procedures reasonable even though the same procedures
would be constitutionally impermissible outside the military."
Courts applying the balancing test to compelled urinalysis of non-mili-
tary public employees76 have recognized the public's interest in having
public employees unimpaired by illegal drugs. Courts have noted that
this need for chemically unimpaired employees is especially great when
employees are working under relatively dangerous conditions. At the
same time, courts have also considered compelled urinalysis a significant
invasion of employees' interest in privacy. 77 Litigation over compelled
urinalysis drug testing of public employees has included disputed testing
of police, firefighters, prison employees, bus drivers, bus attendants, pub-
lic works employees and 'public school teachers.78
Although the courts in these cases have made efforts to distinguish the
72. See United States v. McMurray, 747 F.2d 1417, 1420 (1Ith Cir. 1984) and United States v.
Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1984).
73. 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 474, 478-79.
75. Id. at 474.
76. See supra note 5.
77. See supra note 5 (listing compelled urinalysis cases).
78. See, e.g., Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Susey, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (bus drivers); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C.),
rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (school bus attendants); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (prison employees); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C.
1985) (police); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (public electric and
sewer workers); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (police and
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degree of danger involved in different non-military public employment
positions, they have each required that at a minimum government offi-
cials have reasonable suspicion that specific employees are using illegal
drugs before testing those employees for drug use.79 Some of these courts
have required reasonable suspicion by independently applying the bal-
ancing test to the specific employment position of those persons the gov-
ernment proposes to test.80 Other courts have tied their analysis to other
courts' application of the balancing test to different employment
positions.1
For example, in Turner v. Fraternal drder of Police,82 the court consid-
ered the reasonableness of a police department's drug testing policy,
which provided for compelled urinalysis of policemen based on reason-
able suspicion that the individuals were using illegal drugs.83 The court
noted the dangerous situations that police encounter and stated that each
individual's privacy interest is shaped by the context in which it is as-
serted.84 The court compared the nature of a police officer's job to mili-
tary positions. The court concluded that although policemen are
engaged in a "para-military" profession, it is not reasonable to subject
police to the arbitrary drug testing permitted in Callaway.85 On the
other hand, the court decided that probable cause was not required for
constitutionally permissible compelled urinalysis of the policemen. The
court asserted that the public's interest in having policemen unimpaired
by illegal drugs is significantly greater than the public's interest in
unimpaired private citizens. Therefore, the standard for testing police-
men need not have been as rigorous as the probable cause standard nor-
mally required for investigations of private citizens.86
Similarly, the court in McDonell v. Hunter,87 which considered
whether random compelled urinalysis of Iowa prison employees was rea-
sonable, independently applied the balancing test to the specific employ-
firefighters); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505
N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986) (public school teachers).
79. See supra note 5.
80. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
82. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
83. Id. at 1006.
84. Id. at 1007.
85. Id. at 1008-09.
86 Id.
87. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
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ment position."8 The McDonell court stated that the public's paramount
interest in prison security reduced the scope of prison employees' reason-
able expectation of privacy. Therefore, the prison employment context
makes reasonable some intrusions that would not be reasonable outside
the prison facility.89 The court concluded that the state's interest in se-
curity, though very significant, would not be seriously impaired by re-
quiring reasonable suspicion as the standard for constitutional drug
testing of its prison employees. 90
In City of Palm Bay v. Bauman9 the court addressed whether the
city's drug testing policy for police and firemen was reasonable. 92 The
court concluded that requiring policemen and firemen not suspected of
drug use to submit to compelled urinalysis or face disciplinary action was
unreasonable. The court then stated that such testing was unconstitu-
tional without reasonable suspicion that the specific individuals to be
tested were using illegal drugs.93
Using an afortiori analysis, several courts have related the standard of
suspicion required for drug testing of public employees in specific posi-
tions to the reasonable suspicion standard other courts have required for
drug testing of police, firefighters, train engineers and bus drivers. 94 In
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education 9 a pub-
lic school official proposed random urinalysis drug testing of all teachers
considered for tenure.96 The Patchogue court discussed the school's sig-
nificant interest in detecting any teachers impaired by illegal drug use.97
But the court asserted that the need for detection of illegal drug use by
teachers was not as crucial as the need for detection in such critical pub-
lic positions as police officer, firefighter, bus driver or train engineer-
professions in which the use of illegal drugs creates a much greater threat
to public safety. Noting that other courts have held that such tests in-
88. That is, the court in McDonell applied the balancing test for reasonableness to the specific
facts, including the specific employment position, without relying on another court's decision as a
benchmark for the suspicion standard.
89. 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127-28 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
90. Id. at 1130.
91. 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
92. Id. at 1323.
93. Id. at 1325.
94. See supra note 78 (indicating employment positions involved in government urinalysis drug
testing cases).
95. 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986).
96. 119 A.D.2d at 36, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
97. 119 A.D.2d at 38-49, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
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volving these critical employees were unconstitutional when there was no
reasonable suspicion that they were using illegal drugs, the court con-
cluded that, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion is necessary before pub-
lic school teachers could be subject to such testing.98
Similarly, the court in Jones v. McKenzie99 required reasonable suspi-
cion as the standard for constitutionally compelling school bus attend-
ants to submit to urinalysis drug testing. The court reasoned that the bus
attendants should not be subjected to a drug testing scheme more strin-
gent than that required for police or bus drivers. °0
Finally, the Patchogue court cited Allen v. City of Marietta 10 ' as an
authority which did not require reasonable suspicion for constitutionally
compelling urinalysis of public employees engaged in extremely hazard-
ous work. 0 2 However, although the Allen court held that the city had a
right to make warrantless searches of its employees for the purpose of
determining whether those employees were using drugs, the tests were
administered to employees who had actually been seen smoking mari-
juana by an undercover detective hired by the city. 3 The city hired the
detective in response to an unusually high number of accidents exper-
ienced by the work crew and to a number of reports that the employees
involved were using illegal drugs."°4 Therefore, the city administered the
tests effectively based on reasonable suspicion of specific workers, and it
is not clear what the Allen court might have held had the city adminis-
tered the test on an arbitrary basis.'05
III. COURTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING SHOULD REFLECT
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC JOBS
Except for courts' application of the balancing test to compelled
98. 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
99. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 1508-09.
101. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
102. 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891. The Patchogue court suggested that the court in
Allen allowed random testing of public works employees due to the "extremely hazardous occupa-
tion of working around high voltage wires." Id.
103. 601 F. Supp. at 484-85, 490-91.
104. Id. at 484-85.
105. Courts have held that random testing programs are unreasonable searches and seizures.
See, e-g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.C.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chatta-
nooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986); Scrivner,
supra note 2 at 11.
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urinalysis of military personnel,' 0 6 the nature of the specific public em-
ployment position considered for testing has not played a significant role
in the "public need" side of the balance. Courts have held that reason-
able suspicion is a prerequisite to permissible urinalysis of police,
firefighters, public works employees and public school teachers.107
Therefore, when government officials formulate an employee drug test-
ing program they must adhere to that minimum standard of suspicion.
Using the current court application of the balancing test, it makes no
difference that a firefighter's job may be more dangerous than a police-
man's job, or that each of these jobs involves significantly more danger-
ous situations than does teaching elementary school.'08 Currently, when
applying the balancing test courts do not consider such differences signif-
icant enough to require a different standard of suspicion.
Courts' application of the balancing test to compelled urinalysis has
been too inflexible. A public employee's interest in privacy, though sub-
stantial, does not change between dangerous or "nondangerous" jobs.
No matter how dangerous his job is, a person enjoys his privacy as much
as the person working under the safest conditions. However, the poten-
tial for an immediately dangerous situation varies significantly between a
firefighter and a schoolteacher using illegal drugs on the job. Therefore,
the public's interest in chemically unimpaired employees, and the result-
ing need for urinalysis drug testing of those employees, changes drasti-
cally between relatively dangerous and nondangerous jobs.'0 9
Courts' application of the balancing test to compelled urinalysis situa-
tions should reflect this shifting public interest by requiring a lower level
of suspicion for constitutionally permissible compelled urinalysis of pub-
lic employees in dangerous or critical positions than the suspicion level
required to constitutionally test public employees in relatively safer or
less critical positions. 110
106. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing compelled urinalysis of military
personnel).
107. See supra note 78 (indicating employment positions involved in compelled urinalysis cases).
108. Courts have recognized significant differences in the nature of various public jobs, but have
not found the differences sufficient to justify a different degree of suspicion for permissible compelled
urinalysis on that basis.
109. Public positions involving access to confidential government information generate concerns
of magnitude similar to dangerous jobs. For example, an employee with a drug addiction may be
tempted to sell sensitive information in order to finance his habit.
110. See supra note 109.
[Vol. 66:325
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/5
COURTS AND GOVERNMENT COMPELLED URINALYSIS
IV. "REASONABLE SUSPICION" IS NOT NECESSARILY THE
MOST RIGOROUS STANDARD APPROPRIATE FOR
COMPELLED URINALYSIS
This Note does not argue which particular standard of suspicion
should be required for specific dangerous and relatively nondangerous
public employee positions. Rather, it suggests that courts' application of
the balancing test for reasonableness should require different standards of
suspicion for constitutionally permissible compelled urinalysis of em-
ployees in significantly different working situations."I
On the other hand, the Patchogue court, relying on Camara, suggested
that "reasonable suspicion" is the highest standard for government
urinalysis drug testing of employees, because such searches are "not
aimed at the discovery of evidence for use in a criminal trial." '12 The
Patchogue Court reasoned that because the proposed urinalysis drug test-
ing of public school teachers in that case was aimed at discovering which
teachers were unfit to teach because of illegal drug use, rather than for
prosecution, probable cause was not required. 13
What the Patchogue court overlooked was that the facts and circum-
stances it dealt with differed significantly from those in Camara. First,
although the Camara Court required a level of suspicion lower than
probable cause, the court still required that the health code inspections in
that case be conducted upon search warrants."I4 Therefore, before such
health code inspectors could conduct searches in a specified urban area,
the inferences to support the searches had to be made by a neutral and
detached magistrate." 5 Further, the lower level of suspicion required in
Camara was somewhat offset by the protection provided by a magis-
trate's independent determination of whether officials have the necessary
level of suspicion. In Patchogue, the court left to school officials the re-
sponsibility of assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed that a par-
ticular teacher was using illegal drugs.'1 6 One might argue that, without
an independent magistrate's inference of reasonable suspicion from facts
tending to indicate a particular teacher was using illegal drugs, probable
111. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (listing the four levels of judicially recognized
suspicion).
112. 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
113. Id.
114. 387 U.S. 523, 538-40 (1967).
115. Id.
116. 119 A.D.2d at 40-41, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
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cause should be required to provide the teachers with a substitute for the
,safeguards a magistrate's independent inference would provide.
Secondly, the Camara Court noted that the health code inspection of
homes was not "personal in nature." ' 7 However, compelled urinalysis
for detection of illegal drug use is a much more personal intrusion. In
Camara the health agency's decision to conduct an area inspection was
based on an appraisal of conditions in the urban area as a whole, not on
agency knowledge of specific conditions of a particular building. 1" The
Patchogue court required that permissible compelled urinalysis of teach-
ers should be based on suspicion that a particular teacher is using
drugs.1 19 Further, compelled urinalysis is simply a more personal proce-
dure than a health code inspection of a residence.
Finally, the nature of the evidence sought in compelled urinalysis, as
opposed to the nature of the search, is very different from the evidence
sought in a health code inspection. A public school teacher subjected to
compelled urinalysis for illegal drug use, who has not in fact used illegal
drugs, is nevertheless subject to a potentially significant level of social
stigma among his peers. In this respect, the distinction of compelled
urinalysis as a civil, rather than a criminal procedure, is minimal.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note examines and discusses the law relating to the government's
authority to test its employees for illegal drug use. Relying on Schmerber
v. California, courts have generally held that compelled urinalysis for
that purpose implicates the fourth amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches. Under the fourth amendment, the government's au-
thority to compel urinalysis to detect employees' illegal drug use turns on
courts' application of a balancing test for reasonableness. With the ex-
ception of military personnel, courts have held that government officials
cannot randomly test public employees for illegal drug use.
Courts which decide that compelled urinalysis implicates fourth
amendment protections should offer a convincing basis for that holding.
If these tests constitute fourth amendment searches, the Supreme Court's
decision in Schmerber v. California does not support that conclusion.
117. 387 U.S. at 537.
118. Id. at 536.
119. 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92.
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This Note presents alternative arguments that compelled urinalysis nev-
ertheless amounts to either a fourth amendment search or seizure.
If compelled urinalysis implicates the fourth amendment, courts'
fourth amendment balancing for reasonableness should reflect significant
differences in public jobs. Courts should require a lower level of suspi-
cion for constitutionally permissible compelled urinalysis of public em-
ployees in dangerous or critical positions than the suspicion required to
test public employees in relatively safer or less critical positions.
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